

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

Research and Development Subcommittee

Minutes

One Hundred Eighty Eighth Meeting  
21 February 1985, 1330 Hours  
Ames Building

ATTENDEES

Philip K. Eckman, Central Intelligence Agency  
Alan Petit, SECOM

25X1 [redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency

F. K. Crosher, Department of State

Robert A. Bryan, Department of State

R. J. Solan, Secret Service

George A. Sumner, Department of Army

Paul W. Von Stein, Department of Army

25X1 [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted], Central Intelligence Agency [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted], Central Intelligence Agency [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

Barry D. Baxley, Air Force

25X1 [redacted], National Security Agency

25X1 [redacted], National Security Agency

25X1 [redacted] National Security Agency

25X1 [redacted], National Security Agency

1. The Minutes of the January R&D Subcommittee meeting were read and approved, as amended.

25X1 2. [redacted] CIA, reporting for the Secure Conference Room Working Group, noted that the SECOM report on the enclosure survey had been completed. The A/SE portions were accurate and complete. He suggested that the other IC contributors should read and review their portions of the report. Recently, senior Office of Security managers met with OMB representative to secure [redacted] for the 25X1 next two enclosures, [redacted] GE will 25X1

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25X1 start as soon as funding is available. They will begin manufacturing the development model RF sliding door within weeks. [ ] then asked who are the members of the Secure Conference Room Working Group. It was determined that no one from the R&D Subcommittee was part of the Group.

3. Captain Baxley, USAF, provided a copy of the Advanced Countermeasures Working Group Annual Report, which is attached to these Minutes. Captain Baxley reported that he went to Xetron last month and talked to them about buying some [ ] this year. Three agencies had FY-85 money budgeted to buy [ ] and wanted firm figures for them. Xetron still has not completed the engineering development model, and there is a great deal of risk in placing orders right now. Everyone decided that it was a bit premature to place orders this year. The engineering development model will be completed in June 1985, and a prototype will be ready by February 1986. Xetron will then have a better idea of the problems in building the units, and they will be able to give realistic figures for buying them. The target cost for the [ ] will probably be \$125K-\$150K per unit. Captain Baxley suggested that FY-85 money should be used elsewhere. He asked that anyone with FY-86/87 money budgeted for [ ] let him know

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4. Dr. Eckman, Chairman, noted that the robotic inspection systems is proceeding on schedule and should be ready for deployment in July. Battelle NW thinks they may be able to reduce the size somewhat using present technology. In its present form, our device can go down a 6-inch pipe. Dr. Eckman suggested that the Subcommittee be given another briefing on the program within the next couple of months.

5. Mr. Solan, Secret Service, reporting for the Threat Assessment Working Group, said that the microrobotics threat study is in the process of being reviewed and will be published shortly.

6. Copies were distributed of the R&D Subcommittee's Annual Report to SECOM, and Dr. Eckman asked for comments. Mr. Bryan, State Department, suggested one change; Dr. Eckman agreed and directed that SECOM's copy also be changed.

7. Dr. Eckman said that at its January meeting SECOM had ranked a number of projects, including those submitted by the R&D Subcommittee with its Annual Report. He then distributed copies of the SECOM rankings; a copy is also attached to these Minutes. Mr. Petit, SECOM, discussed the rankings and explained the pencil changes.

8. Dr. Eckman noted that we submitted our figures against a deadline and were required to identify specific projects at that time. Within the categories, there will have to be some shifting. Presently, no decision has been made on who will do the work, and a lot of details are fuzzy. The individual groups will have to decide

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how the money will be allocated. He said that anything considered of high-priority value to the Intelligence Community should be submitted for separate consideration by the SECDEF.

9. Dr. Eckman mentioned that we had not submitted the four items highlighted in green, but we were interested in getting the projects. He noted that Security had put in the polygraph item, but he pointed out that we have done work in that field, too. Much work is needed on new techniques. A new field-portable box is required to replace the aging equipment now in use. Also, another generation polygraph is needed that is microprocessor based and able to accept changes.

10. Dr. Eckman suggested that Item 8 on the Agenda, a preliminary discussion of 1985 project allocation, be postponed to the next meeting. He asked the members to discuss the projects with their own people and then come to the next meeting with suggestions on how the projects should be allocated. He also asked the members to consider whether the items highlighted in green are appropriate to this Subcommittee.

11. In answer to a question, Mr. Petit then discussed where the SECOM money comes from and the problems SECOM has had in the past defending its budget. He noted that there is not a good understanding in the IC Staff of why any money should be given to any Subcommittee. In 1984, no money was allocated at all. He pointed out that at one SECOM meeting Dr. Eckman had helped to explain why good value was received from money given to the Subcommittees. [ ] was mentioned as one very good example. Mr. Petit described another good example: a Navy threat assessment program against computers that was started as a result of SECOM seed money. Although SECOM has been given money this year, we are still not getting enough to meet our needs.

12. Dr. Eckman asked that anyone with specific proposals from his own Agency put together a strawman for the next meeting. We should assume that both the \$133K and the \$270K highlighted in the rankings list will be made available. At the next meeting we will prioritize the list and assign the responsible agent.

13. [ ], DIA, then distributed copies of a document that establishes DIA guidelines for word processing machines. These guidelines, which are being sent out worldwide within DIA and will also apply to all Defense attache offices, are attached to these Minutes. [ ] said he considered items (d) and (e) particularly important. He noted that the main problem was maintenance, which is quite often done in the field by locals. The first page of the guidelines was directed at maintaining the integrity of TEMPEST equipment enroute to its final destination, while the subsequent pages involved operational discipline and the correct use of both TEMPEST and non-TEMPEST equipment overseas. A discussion followed on the problems encountered when trying to

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protect the integrity of TEMPEST equipment and to ensure that both TEMPEST and non-TEMPEST equipment is properly used. One suggestion was that only TEMPEST equipment should be sent overseas. Another was that equipment should be controlled at all times after it has protect the integrity of TEMPEST equipment and to ensure that both TEMPEST and non-TEMPEST equipment is properly used. One suggestion was that only TEMPEST equipment should be sent overseas. Another was that equipment should be controlled at all times after it has been purchased and then switched around periodically without warning. Random inspection of equipment was also suggested.

25X1 [redacted], NSA, noted that introducing more randomness into an embassy would increase the protection of the equipment. Such randomness might make a target not worth the trouble to the Soviets. Establishing interagency repair centers overseas, staffed by cleared Americans, was suggested as one way of maintaining the integrity of the equipment. [redacted] CIA, said that his office is setting up a logistics section to handle such tasks. It was agreed that completely eliminating the risk would be difficult and expensive, but steps can be taken to limit possible damage. Had the above suggestions been in effect, [redacted]

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14. We do not have the money or manpower to protect our equipment as the Soviets do. One problem is the easy access to our embassies. Mr. Bryan, State Department, explained the problems encountered in trying to limit access to embassies. Dr. Eckman suggested that recent events might lead to more limited access to embassies.

15. Dr. Eckman said that Mr. Von Stein, Army, had written a memo suggesting that the document destruction standards set by GSA be amended. In his memo, Mr. Von Stein pointed out discrepancies between standards for pulverizers and shredders. He said that the net area of a particle should be consistent. The Navy had determined that raising particle size resulted in a 50 percent increase in the amount of material that could be destroyed. As a result, Navy changed their standards; and Mr. Von Stein wondered if that might not be appropriate for the rest of the classified world. Such a change would be cost effective and would result in longer life for the machines, without sacrificing security. Hammermills and choppers are the only equipment being discussed. Mr. Von Stein is proposing that the holes on them be larger. If the Subcommittee members agree, we can go forward to GSA and propose that the change be made. Dr. Eckman said that he would send copies of Paul Von Stein's memo to all Subcommittee members and ask for comments by the next meeting. If there are no objections, we will then take a stand on the suggested change.

16. Mr. Bryan reported that the State Department will have no money this year for R&D. If any money becomes available, it will be end-of-year funds.

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18. Mr. Solan asked if any other agency was interested in buying an [ ] this year. LLL is only making 12 or 13. If this Subcommittee as a whole will order more units, we might be able to convince LLL to continue making them and not turn production over to industry. The price LLL is charging is better than we will be able to get from industry. We will get engineering drawings but not production drawings.

19. Captain Baxley said that several months ago they were looking at a no-copy, document-protection technique that used different colors of paper to prevent easy reproduction. Honeywell used a special photographic paper that they put into a copier to produce documents that they believed were impossible to copy with a standard electrostatic copier. Captain Baxley reported that new copiers were able to defeat the system. Honeywell then proposed a study to look at modifying their techniques and available photosensitive paper that could not be reproduced. Preliminary efforts could be defeated.

20. Captain Baxley asked if any agencies used training transmitters for throwing up different kinds of RF signals. Such units are used for training agents in different types of modulation. They are using units built several years ago. A lot of the components in the old boxes are no longer available, and no one else is producing them. Lockheed would like to build new units, which would cost \$16,000 to \$18,000 for each of these small transmitters. The cost was reduced to \$8,300-\$8,400 each by making modifications. The Air Force will use the unit as a good training device. Lockheed has sent in a proposal, and the Air Force is interested in buying 25 units. If anyone else is interested, more units would bring down the cost. This could generate a lot of techniques. Captain Baxley then handed out copies of the proposal. He mentioned that several features that are in the unit are not mentioned in the proposal. Anyone interested in the Lockheed unit was asked to contact Captain Baxley within the next couple of weeks.

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25. The next meeting will be held on 21 March at 1330 hours in the Ames Building.

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